There has been increasing interest in the problem of building accurate data mining models over aggregate data, while protecting privacy at the level of individual records. One approach for this problem is to randomize the values in individual records, and only disclose the randomized values. The model is then built over the randomized data, after first compensating for the randomization (at the aggregate level). This approach is potentially vulnerable to privacy breaches: based on the distribution of the data, one may be able to learn with high confidence that some of the randomized records satisfy a specified property, even though privacy is preserved on average.
INTRODUCTION
The explosive progress in networking, storage, and processor technologies is resulting in an unprecedented amount of digitization of information. In concert with this dramatic and escalating increase in digital data, concerns about privacy of personal inforThis work was supported in part by NSF Grants IIS-0084762, IIS-0121175, IIS-0133481, and CCR-0205452, the Cornell Information Assurance Institute, and by gifts from Microsoft and Intel.
. Assuming that the server receives age 120 from a user, privacy is somewhat compromised, as the server can conclude that the real age of the user cannot be less than 70 (otherwise
' (
). Thus the server has learned a potentially valuable piece of information about the client -information that is correct with % ) 0 0 1 probability. Analogously, sup-pose we randomize a small set of items (a transaction) by replacing each item by a random item with probability 80%. If the transaction contains a subset 2 both before and after randomization, while the probability that 2 occurs in 10 randomly inserted items (out of, say, 10,000 possible items) is less than % 3 I Q P 3 1 [9] . We are aware of two approaches for quantifying how privacypreserving a randomization method is. One approach relies on information theory [1] , the other approach is based on the notion of privacy breaches [9] . The former approach measures the average amount of information disclosed in a randomized attribute by computing the mutual information between the original and the randomized distribution. The latter approach is a worst-case notion, it gives a criterion that should be satisfied by any privacy-preserving algorithm. Intuitively, a privacy breach occurs if a property of the original data record gets revealed if we see a certain value of the randomized record. In our previous example, the randomized age of 120 is an example of a privacy breach as it reveals that the actual age is at least 70. As another example, a privacy breach occurs if a subset within a randomized transaction makes it likely that some item occurs in the original transaction.
As we show in this paper, these two approaches are different: Privacy breaches can occur even though mutual information is small, and therefore propose other information-theoretical measures, called "worst-case information," that do bound privacy breaches.
Paper Outline
We introduce some basic notation in Section 2, followed by an overview of the contributions of the paper. We define privacy breaches in Section 3, and show how the amplification methodology can limit privacy breaches in Section 4. In Section 5, we use pseudorandom generators to dramatically reduce communication and storage cost of randomized transactions. We present new information measures that take privacy breaches into account in Section 6. We conclude with a summary and directions for future work in Section 7.
OVERVIEW

Basic Notions
The Model Suppose there are . The server collects the modified information from all clients and uses it to recover the statistical properties it needs.
Assumptions We assume that each client's piece ¡ ¢ of private information belongs to the same fixed finite setba . Furthermore, we assume that each ¡ ¢ is chosen independently at random according to the same fixed probability distribution. This distribution, denoted c b a and applicable to any property of client's private information. Our privacy preserving restriction involves only the operator's transition probabilities
(see Definition 3 for details). In Statement 1 we prove that if a randomization operator satisfies this condition for some randomized value Y , then the disclosure of Y to the server has a limited effect at breaching privacy, depending on the value of . Itemset Randomization In Section 4.2 we apply amplification (Statement 1) to randomizing itemsets (in the framework of mining association rules). We give a heuristic, based on the solution of an optimization problem, that allows us to choose randomization parameters so that e the randomization operator satisfies condition (1); e the supports of the original itemsets can be recovered from randomized transactions. We illustrate the practical utility of our method through some tradeoff charts.
Compression of Randomized Transactions
Both in the earlier approaches and in the amplification approach for itemset randomization, the randomized transactions may be very long and memory-consuming. Each randomized transaction often contains many thousands of items (order of magnitude more than original transactions); this is needed in order to hide the true items, for preserving privacy. Fortunately, there is a way to "compress" randomized transactions without compromising privacy or support recovery. The idea is to use a pseudorandom generator for computing which items belong to each randomized transaction. The seed for the pseudorandom f generator, one seed per transaction, is chosen so that the randomized transaction contains or does not contain certain pre-selected items from the original transaction. This seed is sufficient to compute the whole randomized transaction or any portion of it, so it serves as a "compressed" randomized transaction.
Section 5 explains how one can construct a suitable pseudorandom generator using error-correcting codes. The method can reduce the size of randomized transactions by several orders of magnitude, without any effect on either privacy or support recovery. The use of the pseudorandom generator results in dropping the full probabilistic independence of "false" items inserted into the randomized transaction, but instead having only of its private information is not disclosed, then a Given: 
Let us consider the following example on privacy breaches.
Example 1. Suppose that private information
¡ is a number between 0 and 1000. This number is chosen as a random variable h such that 0 is 1%-likely whereas any non-zero is only about 0.1%-likely:
Suppose we want to randomize such a number by replacing it with a new random number
that retains some information about the original number ¡ . Here are three possible ways to do it: 1. Given
be ¡ with 20% probability, and some other number (chosen uniformly at random) with 80% probability.
Given
, where is chosen uniformly at random in
with 50% probability, and a uniformly random number otherwise. In Table 1 . However, a different kind of personal information breaks through: the server knows with 100% certainty that h does not lie between 200 and 800. The prior probability of this property is about 40%. Only f 7
seems to be a good privacy preserving randomization.
As Example 1 shows, some randomization operators may not be safe because, if they are used, learning a randomized value sometimes significantly affects posterior probabilities for certain properties of the original private value. To fix this, we either have to make sure that all involved properties are harmless when disclosed to the server, or that no property significantly changes its posterior probability. In this paper we take the latter approach. According to Definition 1, for
we have a 1%-to-70% privacy breach with respect to property T 4 ¡ £ 6
, and for
we have a 40%-to-100% privacy breach with respect to property 4 ¡ Q 6
. What changes in probability should we classify as "significant"? In Example 1 there are two kinds of changes:
has very low prior probability (i.e., is unlikely), but becomes likely once we learn that 
General Approach
Let us define our privacy preserving restriction on randomization operators, and then prove a statement on bounding privacy breaches:
is at most -amplifying for 
as a random variable. Consider any distribution c ¤ a
; since it is nonzero on at least one
By way of contradiction, let us assume that for property 4 ¡ Q 6
we have a £ T -to-
cannot be true for all
by the definition of privacy breach. Analogously, 4 ¡ Q 6
cannot be false for all
. So, the following definitions make sense: and is least likely to get randomized into
Y
. By the definition of conditional probability,
and, in the same way,
, and it follows from the abo
. Therefore, we can divide the lower inequality by the upper one:
Let us remember that
is at most -amplifying for
It remains to notice that
and we arrive to contradiction with condition (3).
To prove the statement for downward
, and then note that condition (3) stays satisfied:
We sometimes call inequality (2) satisfies the amplification condition (2) with C AE
. Indeed, for this operator, transitional probabilities are
Their fractional difference is
. Using Statement 1, we can claim that there are no £ T
, nor the corresponding downward breaches. And we do not even need to know 
If the background information is independent from the randomization operator, all transitional probabilities c r¡ H s Õ Y remain the same, so amplification condition remains unaffected and Statement 1 still applies. However, Definition 1 of £ T -toprivacy breach in the presence of background knowledge is modified: the breach now occurs when
Itemset Randomization
Now we are going to show how to construct randomization operators that satisfy amplification condition (2) for a given and still allow for aggregate data mining by the server. This will be done for one important special case, previously discussed in [9, 17] 
. However, the clients are not willing to disclose their personal transactions, so they use randomization. Here we are going to consider the class of randomizations called "select-a-size," defined in [9] . The definition is as follows:
, the latter being a probability distribution over Let us constrain the select-a-size operator with our amplification condition, to ensure the desired limitation on privacy breaches. We shall use the non-strict form (2), because it will allow us to solve an optimization problem. Denote
, and å q # v wÖ w
. Then the transitional probabilities of the select-a-size can be written as 
the "default" probability of selecting items from × , and "balance" the c ± ' s by dividing them by the "default" probabilities:
While satisfying this condition, we want to transmit as much aggre ð gate information as possible. Randomized transactions are used by the server in order to determine frequent itemsets. So, we would like to ensure that frequent itemsets in randomized transactions have supports as different as possible from infrequent itemsets, with respect to the standard deviation of the supports. Among the parameters of select-a-size, determines the amount of new items added, and (5) and by
The proof of this statement is in Appendix A. , where ÷ is discrete. How to set these two parameters depends on the expected properties of the data, such as how many items are in the itemsets we are mining and what supports these itemsets and their subsets are likely to have. We can use methods from [9] to evaluate the variance in the support estimators, with extra caution when inverting the transition matrix for partial supports since it may be singular for some and ÷ . We computed how much is recoverable after a select-a-size randomization whose parameters are restricted by the amplification condition. The graphs presented here are similar to those in [9] . Again, we use the notion of the lowest discoverable support (LDS), which is the lowest possible support that, when recovered after randomization, has a statistically significant separation from zero. By "statistically significant" we mean a separation from zero by four standard deviations. We have computed LDS, in percent, for 1-item, 2-item, and 3-itemsets while varying three numbers: 1. The privacy breach level £ T (in percent), which we define as the least prior probability for an allowed £ T Figure 1 shows how LDS depends on the privacy requirement. We require that there are no breaches with the prior below T and posterior at 50%, where
. As we see, we can recover supports of about 0.5% when the worst breaches (to 50%) allowed are from 5% to 50%.
The graph on Fig. 2 has its T fixed at 5%, but varies transaction size from 3 to 10. Of course, the longer the transaction, the harder it is to recover supports, since there is more private data to be randomized. Finally, the graph on Fig. 3 shows how the number of transactions affects the recovery (in other graphs the default is 5 million transactions). LDS is roughly inversely proportional to the square root of the number of transactions.
COMPRESSING RANDOMIZED TRANSACTIONS
When applying select-a-size randomization operator (Definition 4) to transactions, we generate randomized transactions with lots of false items. In fact, the size of each randomized transaction is comparable to the overall number of considered items, which may be in many thousands. Sending these randomized transactions may take significant network resources, and such a database will require a lot of memory. Fortunately, there is a way to compress randomized transactions without causing privacy breaches. The idea is -pseudorandom generator is a function
that has the following properties: Any seed that satisfies this condition must have equal chances to be selected. This seed is returned as (the seed for) the randomized transaction.
Pseudorandom select-a-size operator will always find some seed at Step 3 because, if we take h ý ú Î ) Î 3
, then by Definition 5 the variables
are statistically independent and therefore can take any combination of values. Moreover, the following statement shows that a transaction randomized by pseudorandom select-a-size operator f ª has the same distribution with respect to any small subset of items as when it is randomized by the "usual" select-a-size It follows from Statement 3 that all the mathematical apparatus for support and variance estimation from [9] is applicable to pseudorandom select-a-size operators as well, as long as we are working with itemsets of size at most
is a per-transaction operator (it randomizes each transaction independently and its distribution is defined by × ). Generally speaking, it is not item-invariant; however, for an itemset , and on the parameters of select-a-size randomization. Therefore, we can "bypass" iteminvariance. Now let us find out when pseudorandom select-a-size operator protects from privacy breaches. Here we can no longer restrict ourselves to a few items only, since all items at once are involved in a privacy breach. Instead, we can use the amplification condition (2) and Statement 1 in the same way as we used them for the "usual" select-a-size operator in Section 4.2. The following statement shows that the amplification condition in pseudorandom case translates into exactly the same condition (5) . Then
, this probability is (for
If we divide two probabilities like this, the constant multiplier will cancel out:
were defined in (4).
As a consequence of Statement 4, all methodology described in Section 4.2 for select-a-size randomization operators can be applied for pseudorandom select-a-size operators.
It remains to construct an example of a
, these generators, also known as orthogonal arrays [11] , can be constructed using linear error-correcting codes [14, 16] . A binary linear error-correcting code of size 
This , and compressed transaction becomes 0 ! ( bits, while ordinary way needs at least
WORST-CASE INFORMATION
Amplification approach from Section 4 is designed to be independent on the prior distribution, to depend only on the randomization operator itself. There can be other ways to restrict disclosure, other privacy measures that depend both on the prior distribution of private data and on the operator. In this section we consider a class of privacy measures inspired by Shannon's information theory [19] , adjusted so that they bound privacy breaches.
In the paper [1] the authors introduce a measure of privacy which is a function of mutual information between two distributions, the original data distribution and the randomized data distribution. Suppose that h is a random variable such that each data record is its independent instance. Let
be another random variable ( 
It is assumed that the larger with probability 60% and outputs % © w ¡ with probability 40%:
The second randomization 
Intuitively, f is a very poor randomizer since if we see, say, l # %
, then we know with very high probability that 
Now we are going to show that knowing worst-case information gives a bound on upward privacy breaches. The proof of this statement is in Appendix A.4. has little sensitivity to both of them. The same trend was shown in Table 1 .
CONCLUSION
We presented a new defintion of privacy breaches, and developed a general approach, called amplification, that provably limits breaches. Amplification can be used to limit privacy breaches with respect to any single-record property. More importantly, unlike earlier approaches, this approach does not require knowledge of the data distribution to provide privacy guarantees. We instantiated this approach for the problem of mining association rules, and derived the amplification condition for the select-a-size randomization operator.
Next, we gave a method for compressing long randomized transactions by using pseudorandom generators, and showed that this could reduce their sizes by orders of magnitude. Finally, we defined several new information-theoretical privacy measures that provably bound privacy breaches.
We conclude with some interesting directions for future research.
e How do we extend amplification to continuous distributions?
e What is the relationship between the specific randomization operators, and the tradeoff between privacy and accuracy?
In particular, how do we identify the randomization operator and parameters that will provide the highest accuracy in the mining model for a given level of privacy breaches? 
